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DEFINITION OF "EMPLOYEE" WITHIN THE
NEBRASKA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
ACT
Ben Novicoff*
Any attempt to explain what is meant by the word "em-
ployee" must be prefaced by a statement that there is a differ-
ence between the workmen's compensation definition and the
common-law definition. The definition for workmen's compensa-
tion purposes is generally broader in keeping with the philosophy
of compensating workmen for injuries arising out of and in the
course of his employment regardless of fault. Exactly how
broadly the word "employee" should be construed within the
Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Act has created much litiga-
tion.
The intent of this article is to synthesize the problems that
have arisen in construing the Nebraska act. An attempt has
been made to include all the "definition of employee" cases that
have been decided by the Nebraska Supreme Court.
I. CASUAL EMPLOYMENT AND THE REGULAR TRADE,
BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION OF THE EMPLOYER
The Nebraska act, in defining employee, excludes "any per-
son whose employment is casual, and which is not in the usual
course of the trade, business, profession or occupation of his
employer .... 1
Casual is defined as "occasional; coming at certain times
without regularity, in distinction from stated or regular .... -2
Thus, a person's employment is casual where he renders a par-
ticular service which is not continuous or regular, but only oc-
casional to the business,3 as for instance a man who unloads coal
cars at irregular intervals and only on occasion. 4 However, the
* B.A. 1942, LL.B. 1948, University of Nebraska; Judge, Nebraska
Workmen's Compensation Court since 1952.
1 NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-115 (Reissue 1960).
2 Hiestand v. Ristau, 135 Neb. 881, 887, 284 N.W. 756, 760 (1939).
3 Petrow & Giannou v. Shewan, 108 Neb. 466, 187 N.W. 940 (1922);
Guse v. Wessels, 132 Neb. 41, 270 N.W. 665 (1937).
4 Bridger v. Lincoln Feed & Fuel Co., 105 Neb. 222, 179 N.W. 1020
(1920). See also McConnell v. Johnston, 139 Neb. 619, 298 N.W.
346 (1941) (owner of saw hired claimant to help cut wood for
farmer's cook stove-casual employee).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 41, 1961
shortness of time spent on the job is not controlling,5 especially
where the employment is for an indefinite period of time or the
employee is to report regularly for work.6
It should be carefully noted that to escape liability under
this section7 the employer must show both conditions;8 that is,
that the employment is both casual and not in the usual course
of the trade, business, profession or occupation of the employer.9
Where the employment is more than casual, there is still no
liability if the injury did not arise from the regular trade, busi-
ness, profession or vocation of the employer.' 0 For example,
where a person is hired to work on the employer's residence, any
injury received on such a job would not be compensable because,
although the employment is more than casual, the employer's
regular trade is not repairing his personal residence." A car-
penter, however, hired to repair farm buildings owned by a life
insurance company who was renovating the farm for investment
purposes, was engaged in the regular business of the company.'2
5 Nebraska Nat'l Guard v. Morgan, 112 Neb. 432, 199 N.W. 557 (1924)
(carpenter hired to erect shed kitchens for Nebraska National Guard,job to last for approximately ten days-entitled to compensation
since term of service indefinite and job in usual course of trade of
National Guard).
6 Dietz Club v. Niehaus, 110 Neb. 154, 193 N.W. 344 (1923); Nosky v.
Farmer's Union Co-op Ass'n, 109 Neb. 489, 191 N.W. 846 (1922);
Nedela v. Mares Auto Co., 106 Neb. 883, 184 N.W. 885 (1921). Com-
pare Gruber v. Stickelman, 149 Neb. 627, 31 N.W.2d 753 (1948)
(claimant hired from time to time at livestock auction house to work
at sales conducted six or seven times a month-not casual employee).
7 NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-115 (Reissue 1960).
8 The requirement of regular trade, business, profession, or vocation
is further emphasized in NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-106(1), -115(2)
(Reissue 1960).
9 Sentor v. City of Lincoln, 124 Neb. 403, 246 N.W. 924 (1933); Sher-
lock v. Sherlock, 112 Neb. 797, 201 N.W. 645 (1924).
10 Coyne v. City of O'Neill, 139 Neb. 686, 298 N.W. 547 (1941) (lady
given ride to train station by chief of police-not regular business
of city).
1 Retzlaff v. Dickinson, 141 Neb. 136, 2 N.W.2d 922 (1942) (moving
a farmer's barn); Burkholder v. Clark, 140 Neb. 590, 300 N.W. 839
(1941) (painting a farmer's barn). Compare Kaplan v. Gaskill, 108
Neb. 455, 187 N.W. 943 (1922) (employee hired by junk dealer to
remodel homes for junk dealer to rent-not junk dealer's regular
business) with Bauer v. Anderson, 114 Neb. 326, 207 N.W. 508 (1926)
(hod carrier employed by retired farmer to remodel house to be
used as rental apartment-engaged in employer's regular business).
12 Hiestand v. Ristau, 135 Neb. 881, 284 N.W. 756 (1939). Cf. Sherlock
v. Sherlock, 112 Neb. 797, 201 N.W. 645 (1924) (hired to paint build-
ing used by wholesale drug company-employee since building used
for company's business purposes).
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II. CONTRACT OF HIRE NECESSARY
The Nebraska act requires that there be a contract of hire
between the employer and employee which may be express or
implied, oral or written.13 In this respect, the compensation
concept of employee is narrower than the common-law concept
of servant, as under the compensation law there must be mutual
consent and some payment.14
The criterion of control has been used in determining whether
or not the claimant was an employee. Thus if an employer has
no control or supervision over a claimant nor any right to direct
the manner in which work is done, it has been held that a claim-
ant is not an employee. 15 If, however, an employer has full
control and dictates the details of the work and can accept the
workman's services or discharge him, an employer-employee re-
lationship has been found.16
In any case of a loaned employee, the relationship of em-
ployer and employee must be established before the special
employer is liable.17  The test as established by Shamburg v.
Shamburg's is as follows:
[TIhe general test in determining whether an employee is a
servant of his original master, or of the party to whom he has
been furnished, is whether in the particular service which he
is engaged to perform he continues to be liable to the direction
and control of his master, or becomes subject to that of the party
to whom he is lent or hired.19
In cases where the contention is made that the claimant is
an independent contractor and thus is not an employee under a
"contract of hire" as contemplated by the act, the court has held
that "the contract under which service is performed, and the
13 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-114, -115 (Reissue 1960). See Vandenburg v.
Center Township, 123 Neb. 544, 243 N.W. 636 (1932), aff'd on re-
hearing, 124 Neb. 790, 248 N.W. 310 (1933); Holt County v. Mullen,
126 Neb. 102, 252 N.W. 799 (1934).
14 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), AGENCY §§ 221, 224, 225 (1958); Lind v.
Nebraska Nat'l Guard, 144 Neb. 122, 12 N.W.2d 652 (1944) (member
of National Guard not an employee because of lack of freedom in
contracting-member simply performing duty owed to the sovereign
state).
15 Williams v. City of Wymore, 138 Neb. 257, 292 N.W. 726 (1940).
16 Hendershot v. City of Lincoln, 136 Neb. 606, 286 N.W. 909 (1939).
17 Shamburg v. Shamburg, 153 Neb. 495, 45 N.W.2d 446 (1950). See
Shada v. Whitney, 172 Neb. 220, 109 N.W.2d 167 (1961).
18 153 Neb. 495, 45 N.W.2d 446 (1950).
19 Id. at 502, 45 N.W.2d at 450-51.
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performance thereunder, determine the relationship between the
contracting parties. '20
III. EMPLOYEE V. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR
An independent contractor is not an employee under the
compensation law and therefore is not entitled to compensation. 2'
In attempting to determine, in a particular case, if a claimant is
an employee or an independent contractor, there are a number
of accepted tests. The difficulty arises in the application of the
tests and the weight to be given to each.
It is quite often difficult to distinguish between the relation of
employee and independent contractor. There is no one criterion,
but several elements may enter into the determination .... No
one fact can be relied upon as a test or criterion, but the nature
of the relation must be determined from all the evidence. 22
The Nebraska court has continuously reiterated, however,
that control is the important test,23 and have quoted with ap-
proval the following statement: 24
The true test of a 'contractor' would seem to be that he renders
the service in the course of an independent occupation, represent-
ing the will of his employer only as to the result of his work,
and not as to the means by which it is accomplished .... In
actual affairs an independent contractor generally pursues the
business of contracting, enters into a contract with his employer
20 Schneider v. Village of Shickley, 156 Neb. 683, 685, 57 N.W.2d 527,
529 (1953); Snodgrass v. City of Holdrege, 166 Neb. 329, 89 N.W.2d
66 (1958).
21 NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-115 (Reissue 1960); Petrow & Giannou v.
Shewan, 108 Neb. 466, 187 N.W. 940 (1922).
22 Barrett v. Selden-Breck Constr. Co., 103 Neb. 850, 855, 174 N.W.
866, 868 (1919) (other factors held sufficient to outweigh control
employer had over work). See also Potter v. Scotts Bluff County,
112 Neb. 318, 199 N.W. 507 (1924) (employer giving instructions to
insure compliance with contract-not inconsistent with independent
contractor relationship).
23 Wilds v. Morehouse, 152 Neb. 749, 42 N.W.2d 649 (1950); Westcoatt
v. Lilley, 134 Neb. 376, 278 N.W. 854 (1938); Presher v. Baker Ice
Mach. Co., 132 Neb. 648, 273 N.W. 48 (1937); Reeder v. Kimball
Laundry, 129 Neb. 306, 261 N.W. 562 (1935); Aeschleman v. Haschen-
burger Co., 127 Neb. 207, 254 N.W. 899 (1934); Standish v. Larson-
Merryweather Co., 124 Neb. 197, 245 N.W. 606 (1932); State Auto.
Ins. Ass'n v. Pickett, 124 Neb. 481, 247 N.W. 27 (1932); Showers v.
Lund, 123 Neb. 56, 242 N.W. 258 (1932); Johnson v. Smith, 123 Neb.
716, 243 N.W. 894 (1932); Priest v. Business Men's Protective Ass'n,
117 Neb. 198, 220 N.W. 255 (1928); Christensen v. Protector Sales
Co., 105 Neb. 389, 181 N.W. 146 (1920).
24 1 SHEARMAN & REDFIELD, LAW OF NEGLIGENCE § 164, at 395 (6th ed.
1913).
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to do a specified piece of work for a specific price, makes his
own subcontracts, employs, controls, pays and discharges his own
employees, furnishes his own material and directs and controls
the execution of his work. Where these conditions concur there
is, of course, no difficulty in determining his character as such.
It is only where one or more of them is lacking that a question
arises. The one indispensable element to his character as an in-
dependent contractor is that he must have contracted to do a
specified work and have the right to control the mode and
manner of doing it.
The right of control is the essential consideration rather than
the exercise thereof.25  In order to have the relation of inde-
pendent contractor, the right of control must be limited to that
necessary to insure compliance with the contract. 26 It is always
necessary that the final results meet the approval of those who
pay for it.27  If the right of control over the workman extends
no further than this, then he probably is an independent con-
tractor,28 but in any case where the employer does have the
right to control the method and manner of doing the work, the
workman is an employee.29 The extent to which the workman
is, in fact, independent in the performance of his work is the
ultimate test of control. The right to terminate the relationship
without liability is a strong indication of the employee status.3 0
If the workman can be fired without liability, he is certainly
under the control of his employer and if he can quit without
liability, it cannot be said that his relation is consistent with that
of an independent contractor.
The court has also considered the following factors as an
aid in determining whether or not there is an employee or a
contractor relationship.
(1) Mode of Payment. Payment on a completed job basis is
indicative of an independent contractor relationship,3 1 while pay-
ment on an hourly or weekly basis is indicative of an employee
25 Schou v. Village of Hildreth, 127 Neb. 784, 257 N.W. 70 (1934); Claus
v. DeVere, 120 Neb. 812, 235 N.W. 450 (1931).
26 Knuffke v. Bartholomew, 106 Neb. 763, 184 N.W. 889 (1921).
27 Nollett v. Holland Lumber Co., 141 Neb. 538, 4 N.W.2d 554 (1942).
28 But see Schneider v. Village of Shickley, 156 Neb. 682, 57 N.W.2d
527 (1953).
29 Petrow & Giannou v. Shewan, 108 Neb. 466, 187 N.W. 940 (1922);
Barrett v. Selden-Breck Constr. Co., 103 Neb. 850, 174 N.W. 866
(1919).
30 Knuffke v. Bartholomew, 106 Neb. 763, 184 N.W. 889 (1921).
31 Nollett v. Holland Lumber Co., 141 Neb. 538, 4 N.W.2d 554 (1942).
But see Gardner v. Kothe, 172 Neb. 364, 109 N.W.2d 405 (1961).
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status. 32 Payment on commission or piece work can be consistent
with either an independent contractor or employee relation.33
(2) Tools. Who furnishes the equipment, materials and tools
may be indicative of the type of relationship, but it is never the
controlling factor.34
(3) Work for Others. The fact that the workman may also
work for others as he pleases or has an independent business is
indicative of an independent contractor relation.35 If the work-
man may hire others to help him do the work, it is an indication
of an independent contractor status,36 but if he must do the work
personally it indicates an employment status. 37
(4) Supervision. If the claimant supervises, pays the wages
and exercises the right to hire and fire other workers, this would
indicate an independent contractor relationship,3   but if these
duties are performed by the employer, an employee relationship
is indicated.39
(5) Social Security and Workmen's Compensation. Whether
the employer deducts social security taxes from the claimant's
wages and whether the claimant pays workmen's compensation
on his helpers is relevant but not conclusive of the employee
relation. 40
(6) Time. The time for which the claimant is employed,
whether indefinite or for a particular job, whether at certain
specified hours or at the pleasure of the workman, is an impor-
tant consideration. 4
1
32 Peterson v. Christenson, 141 Neb. 151, 3 N.W.2d 404 (1942). But see
Snodgrass v. City of Holdrege, 166 Neb. 329, 89 N.W.2d 66 (1958);
Petrow & Giannou v. Shewan, 108 Neb. 466, 187 N.W. 940 (1922).
33 Riggins v. Lincoln Tent & Awning Co., 143 Neb. 893, 11 N.W.2d 810
(1943).
34 Knuffke v. Bartholomew, 106 Neb. 763, 184 N.W. 889 (1921); Barrett
v. Selden-Breck Constr. Co., 103 Neb. 850, 174 N.W. 866 (1919).
35 Reeder v. Kimball Laundry, 129 Neb. 306, 261 N.W. 562 (1935).
But see Riggins v. Lincoln Tent & Awning Co., 143 Neb. 893, 11
N.W.2d 810 (1943); Cole v. Minnick, 123 Neb. 871, 244 N.W. 785
(1932).
36 Petrow & Giannou v. Shewan, 108 Neb. 466, 187 N.W. 940 (1922).
37 Cole v. Minnick, 123 Neb. 871, 244 N.W. 785 (1932).
38 Snodgrass v. City of Holdrege, 166 Neb. 329, 89 N.W.2d 66 (1958).
39 Knuffke v. Bartholomew, 106 Neb. 763, 184 N.W. 889 (1921).
40 Riggins v. Lincoln Tent & Awning Co., 143 Neb. 893, 11 N.W.2d 810
(1943).
41 Riggins v. Lincoln Tent & Awning Co., 143 Neb. 893, 11 N.W.2d 810
(1943). See also Nollett v. Holland Lumber Co., 141 Neb. 538,
4 N.W.2d 554 (1942).
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(7) Contract. The actual existence of a contract for perform-
ance of a specified piece of work at a fixed price is a very strong
indication of an independent contractor status.42
(8) Where Work is Performed. Where the work done is an
integral part of the employer's regular business, and when the
worker does not furnish an independent business or professional
service, it should indicate an employee status.43
But again, it must be stated that in Nebraska, it appears
that the most important test to establish an employee status is
control over the details of the work, not only as to the final
result, but in the mode and manner of the performance of the
task itself.44 However, this is not the only test because all the
facts in the case are pertinent. 45
IV. EMPLOYEES OF RAILROADS ENGAGED IN INTER-
STATE OR FOREIGN COMMERCE, HOUSEHOLD DO-
MESTIC SERVANTS, FARM AND RANCH LABORERS
AND HOME WORKERS
Railroad companies engaged in interstate or foreign com-
merce are excluded from the Nebraska Workmen's Compensa-
tion Law,40 and employers of household domestic servants 47 and
farm and ranch laborers, 48 are also excluded. Employers of
household domestic servants or farm or ranch laborers, however,
may elect to come under the act by carrying compensation in-
surance.49 If an exempt employer does carry insurance it is
considered to be conclusive proof that the employer and his
employee will be bound by the terms of the act,5" except that
any such employee may elect not to accept the act.51
42 Lowe v. Chicago Lumber Co., 135 Neb. 735, 283 N.W. 841 (1939).
43 This may be the real basis for the decisions in Cole v. Minnick, 123
Neb. 871, 244 N.W. 785 (1932), and Schneider v. Village of Shickley,
156 Neb. 683, 57 N.W.2d 527 (1953).
44 1 SHEARmAN & REDFIELD, LAw OF NEGLIGENCE § 164 (6th ed. 1913).
45 Knuffke v. Bartholomew, 106 Neb. 763, 184 N.W. 889 (1921).
46 NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-106(1) (Reissue 1960); Chicago, B. & Q. R.R.
v. Amack, 112 Neb. 437, 199 N.W. 724 (1924). See also Summers v.
Railway Express Agency, 134 Neb. 237, 278 N.W. 476 (1938).
47 NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-106(2) (Reissue 1960).
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-106(3) (Reissue 1960).
51 Ibid.
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In the case of household domestic servants, it appears that
they would not come under the act in any event because they
are not employed in the regular trade, business, profession or
vocation of the employer.52  It should be noted, however, that
the exemption applies only to household domestic servants and
not to domestic servants generally.53 It must also be noted that
the statute does not exclude the domestic servant or farm or
ranch laborer, but rather excludes their employer. It is the
class of employers which is excluded rather than the employee.
This means that the character of the business of the employer
is insignificant if he is an employer of farm laborers.54 Once
the character of the labor is determined, no inquiry as to the
occupation or commercial status of the employer is pertinent.55
Thus, if a person is hired to engage in nonfarm work on a farm,
he is not a farm laborer within the meaning of the act even
though his employer is a farmer. 56 The Nebraska court has
also held that a workman is not a farm laborer simply because
at the moment, he is doing work on a farm, or because the task
on which he is engaged happens to be what is ordinarily con-
sidered farm labor. The whole character of his employment
must be examined to determine whether he is a farm laborer.57
Section 48-115 (2) (2) excludes from the definition of em-
ployee "any person to whom articles and materials are given
to be made up, cleaned, washed, finished, repaired or adapted
for sale in the worker's own home or in other premises not under
the control or management of the employer, unless the employee
is required to perform the work at a place designated by the
employer. ' 58  There appear to be no Nebraska cases on this sub-
ject. 59
52 NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-106(1) (Reissue 1960).
53 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 50.30 (1952).
54 Keefover v. Vasey, 112 Neb. 424, 199 N.W. 799 (1924). See also Keith
v. Wilson, 165 Neb. 58, 84 N.W.2d 192 (1957).
55 Id. at 424, 199 N.W. 799.
56 Guse v. Wessels, 132 Neb. 41, 270 N.W. 665 (1937); Hiestand v. Ristau
135 Neb. 881, 284 N.W. 756 (1939).
57 Gruber v. Stickelman, 149 Neb. 627, 31 N.W.2d 753 (1948) (work-
man for livestock commission house who sorted cattle and wrote
tickets-not excluded by farm laborer provision); Oliver v. Ernst,
148 Neb. 465, 27 N.W.2d 622 (1947) (employee of employer who
contracted to move dirt for farmer by bulldozer-not excluded by
farm laborer provision).
58 NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-115(2) (2) (Reissue 1960).
59 See dissent in Cole v. Minnick, 123 Neb. 871, 875, 244 N.W. 785, 787
(1932).
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V. MINORS
Prior to 1959, minors who were legally permitted to work
under the laws of Nebraska, were included within the definition
of employee.0° Thus, a minor not legally prohibited from work-
ing, could bring an action under the Nebraska Workmen's Com-
pensation Act,61 and in fact was limited to an action under the
act. 6 2  A minor who was legally prohibited from working was
not required to rely on the compensation act for damages and
could bring a common-law action.63
Since 1959, however, it appears clear that all minors are
limited to an action under the compensation act for damages.
64
VI. EMPLOYEES OF STATE AND GOVERNMENTAL
AGENCIES CREATED BY THE STATE
The Nebraska act includes as employees every person in the
service of the state or of any governmental agency created by
it, except officials who are either elected or appointed for a
regular term of office or to complete the unexpired portion of
any regular term. 6 Thus, a carpenter employed by the Nebraska
National Guard to build shed kitchens for the Guard's summer
camp was held to be an employee because in the preparation for
and holding of the annual encampment, the Nebraska National
Guard was a governmental agency of the state.66
The phrase "regular term of office" 67 has been defined to
mean a term with a "fixed and definite duration and a date of
termination known and fixed by law or other general regula-
tion."68  Within this definition a captain in a city fire depart-
ment was not an official appointed for a regular term69 but a
60 Neb. Laws c. 93, p. 370 (1941).
61 Krajeski v. Beem, 157 Neb. 586, 60 N.W.2d 651 (1953).
62 Navracel v. Cudahy Packing Co., 109 Neb. 506, 191 N.W. 659 (1922).
63 Benner v. Evans Laundry Co., 117 Neb. 701, 222 N.W. 630 (1929).
64 NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-115(2) (Reissue 1960).
65 NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-115(1) (Reissue 1960). This includes water,
street and light commissioners if they are not elected.
66 Nebraska Nat'l Guard v. Morgan, 112 Neb. 432, 199 N.W. 557 (1924).
But see Lind v. Nebraska Nat'l Guard, 144 Neb. 122, 12 N.W.2d 652
(1944).
67 NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-115(1) (Reissue 1960).
68 Rooney v. City of Omaha, 105 Neb. 447, 181 N.W. 143 (1920).
69 Shandy v. City of Omaha, 127 Neb. 406, 255 N.W. 477 (1934); City
of Fremont v. Lea, 115 Neb. 565, 213 N.W. 820 (1927) (paid member
of city fire department-employee of the city).
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village marshal appointed by the village board on a year to
year basis was held to be an officer of the village appointed for
a regular term of office and not an employee.7 0 A member of
a town board, holding his office by virtue of his election as
justice of the peace for a fixed, definite and regular term was
held to be an official elected for a regular term of office and
the fact that he did some work not required by his office and
charged the township for this work did not change his character
as an official since there was no contract of employment. 7 '
A serious problem has arisen as to the status of certain
workmen employed on a city project but paid from federal
funds. The authority to control the details of the work or to
direct the mode and manner of doing the work appears to be
the basis of determining the status. Where the city has entire
charge of directing and controlling the work of a brick layer,
he was held to be an employee of the city, although his wages
were paid from federal funds.7 2 But where the city had no au-
thority to control the details of the work or to direct the mode
and manner of doing it, a laborer was held not to be an em-
ployee of the city even though the city furnished certain equip-
ment, material, supplies and other items, and the superintendent
of the project was the city's street commissioner paid by the
city.7
3
VII. VOLUNTEER FIREMEN
The act specifically includes as employees volunteer firemen
of any fire department of any rural or suburban fire protection
district provided certain qualifications are met: (1) the fire de-
partment must be regularly organized under the laws of the State
of Nebraska; (2) the claimant must be a member of such depart-
70 Suverkrubbe v. Village of Fort Calhoun, 127 Neb. 472, 256 N.W. 47
(1934). See also Anderson v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 155 Neb. 590,
52 N.W.2d 814 (1952) (private citizen called into service as mem-
ber of sheriff's posse-employee within meaning of the act); Davis
v. Lincoln County, 117 Neb. 148, 219 N.W. 899 (1928) (one employed
to repair bridges for county as occasion arose-employee of county).
7' Vandenburg v. Center Township, 123 Neb. 544, 243 N.W. 636 (1932),
afi'd on rehearing, 124 Neb. 790, 248 N.W. 310 (1933).
72 Hendershot v. City of Lincoln, 136 Neb. 606, 286 N.W. 909 (1939).
73 Glantz v. City of Lincoln, 140 Neb. 515, 300 N.W. 572 (1941); Wil-
liams v. City of Wymore, 138 Neb. 256, 292 N.W. 726 (1940). See
also Steward v. Deuel County, 137 Neb. 516, 289 N.W. 877 (1940)
(county made arrangement with village for latter to employ fore-
man to handle supervision of highway repair-county still paid for
labor and had utlimate control-claimant hired by foreman employee
of county).
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ment; (3) the members of the fire department must be recom-
mended by the chief of the fire department to the appropriate
auhtority and by such authority be confirmed, and (4) the mem-
ber must not have been removed by such authority at the time
of the accident and must be acting in the performance and within
the scope of his duties.7 4
VIII. CIVIL DEFENSE WORKERS
Because of the increasing possibility that members of civil de-
fense agencies may be injured while in the performance of their
duties without any protection under the workmen's compensa-
tion act, the 1961 Legislature amended the act to include, under
the definition of employee all members of the State Civil De-
fense Agency, or of any local organization for civil defense or
civil defense mobile support unit, which Agency, organization,
or unit is regularly organized under the laws of the State of
Nebraska, while in the performance of their duties as members
of such Agency, organization or unit.7 5
IX. PARTNERS AND CORPORATE OFFICERS
Section 48-115 (2) begins its definition of employee by stat-
ing: "Every person in the service of an employer . . . ."T This
section contemplates that there be two persons, the employee
and the employer. It does not contemplate the dual relationship
of partnerships even though the partner may be a working part-
ner. Thus, where the partnership contract provided that one
of the partners should be the active manager and devote all of
his time to the business and to receive $250.00 per month, it was
held that he was an employer and not an employee.7 7
A corporation on the other hand is a complete entity, sepa-
rate and distinguishable from its stockholders and officers. If
it sees fit to have one of its officers serve in the capacity of an
ordinary employee, there is nothing to prevent it from so doing
74 NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-115(1) (Reissue 1960); Clark v. Village of
Hemingford, 147 Neb. 1044, 26 N.W.2d 15 (1947) (claimant's name
carried on roll of active members of fire department-village trustees
confirmed roll-claimant was employee); Eagle Indem. Co. v. Vil-
lage of Creston, 29 Neb. 850, 263 N.W. 220 (1935) (members of vol-
unteer fire department not recommended by chief of department
for membership and not confirmed by the village board-not em-
ployees of village).
75 NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-115(1) (f) (Reissue 1960).
76 NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-115(2) (Reissue 1960).
77 Rasmussen v. Trico Feed Mills, 148 Neb. 855, 29 N.W.2d 641 (1947).
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and such employee-officer would be entitled to workmen's com-
pensation for an injury received while doing such work based
on the wages received by him in the capacity of an employee.
But an executive officer of a corporation is not, as such, its em-
ployee in the ordinary use of the word and does not come within
the provisions of the Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Act.7 8
X. EMPLOYEE UNDER SCHEME, ARTIFICE OR DEVICE
Part of the question involving the definition of employee
arises from section 48-116 which attempts to reach employers
who would avoid the act by subcontracting without requiring
the subcontractor to carry compensation insurance. In his treatise
on workmen's compensation, Larson states: 79
The purpose of this legislation was to protect employees of
irresponsible and uninsured subcontractors by imposing ultimate
liability on the presumably responsible principal contractor, who
has it within his power, in choosing sub-contractors, to pass
upon their responsibility and insist upon appropriate compensa-
tion protection for their workers.
In Nebraska, the owner is included among those who may be
held responsible if he does not require the contractor to carry
workmen's compensation insurance. If anyone creates or carries
into operation any scheme, artifice or device attempting to defeat
the provisions of the compensation act, they are included in the
term "employer.18 0  But, where an owner or a contractor lets or
sublets a contract or a part thereof and does require the contrac-
tor or subcontractor to carry compensation insurance, he is not
an employer, but is a "third party"8' under the compensation
law,8 2 who can be held liable at common law for his negligence
for injuring the employee of his subcontractor.8 3 Where the
owners of a building themselves engage a contractor and do not
require him to carry workmen's compensation insurance, they
78 Soiheim v. Hastings Housing Co., 151 Neb. 264, 37 N.W.2d 212 (1949).
79 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 49.11 (1952).
80 NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-118 (Reissue 1960).
81 Mathews v. Crancer Co., 117 Neb. 805, 223 N.W. 661 (1929). Boyd
v. Humphreys, 117 Neb. 799, 223 N.W. 658 (1929).
82 NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-118 (Reissue 1960).
83 Mathews v. Crancer Co., 117 Neb. 805, 223 N.W. 661 (1929); Tralle
v. Hartman Furniture & Carpet Co., 116 Neb. 418, 217 N.W. 952
(1928) (owner of building leased for furniture store gave lessee
right to remodel but took no part-not employer of workman em-
ployed by contractor who was engaged by lessee).
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will be considered to be employers8 4 even though their intentions
were honest. The terms of the statute, "any scheme, artifice or
device," do not necessarily imply fraud or evil design,8 5 the
term "requires" being interpreted to mean compel or exact.8 0
If an employee rejects the act, however, the fact that the owner
did not require the contractor to carry compensation insurance
would not make the owner an employer of this employee.8 't
A true vendor-vendee relationship is not a scheme, artifice
or device. Thus, where a vendor sold lumber to an employer
who has his employee cut and load the lumber in the vendor's
yard, it was held that the vendor was not an employer under
the act.88
XI. EMPLOYEE OF JOINT EMPLOYERS
Where an employee, entitled to compensation is, at the time
of his injury, employed and paid jointly by two or more em-
ployers, the employers must contribute to the payment of the
compensation in proportion to their several wage liabilities to
the employee.8 9 Such employers may, however, make arrange-
ments among themselves for a different distribution of the comp-
ensation liability.90 If not all the employers are subject to the
act, those employers who do fall within the act must pay that
proportion of the compensation which their wage liability bears
to the entire wage of the employee.91
In order to come within this section, there must be joint
employment. This has been defined to mean that there must be
some joint arrangement between two or more employers as to
salary, wages, hours of employment or terms of service. In the
84 New Masonic Temple Ass'n v. Glove Indem. Co., 134 Neb. 731, 279
N.W. 745 (1938); Jones v. Rossback Coal Co., 130 Neb. 302, 264 N.W.
877 (1936).
85 Sherlock v. Sherlock, 112 Neb. 797, 201 N.W. 645 (1924).
86 Riggins v. Lincoln Tent & Awning Co., 143 Neb. 893, 11 N.W.2d 810
(1943); Hiestand v. Ristau, 135 Neb. 881, 284 N.W. 756 (1939).
87 White v. National Window Cleaning Co., 132 Neb. 155, 271 N.W. 341
(1937).
88 Heider v. Stoughton, 150 Neb. 741, 35 N.W.2d 814 (1949). See also
McConnell v. Johnston, 139 Neb. 619, 298 N.W. 346 (1941).
89 NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-129 (Reissue 1960).
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid. See Summers v. Railway Express Agency, 134 Neb. 237, 278
N.W. 476 (1938).
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absence of such arrangement, there can be no joint employ-
ment.
92
XII. ALIENS
Aliens, who otherwise meet the definition of employee, have
the same rights under the act as any other employee.9 3 Alien
dependents, who are not residents of the United States, of an
employee who dies as a result of an accident arising out of and
in the course of his employment may be required to take all
future installments of compensation payable in a lump sum equal
to two-thirds of the total amount of such future installments at
the option of the employer.94 Excluded from those dependents
who are entitled to compensation are alien widowers, and broth-
ers and sisters not residents of the United States. 95
XIII. EMPLOYEE OF NON-RESIDENT EMPLOYER
Prior to the 1957 amendment to section 48-106,96 the major
test as to whether or not an employee of a foreign employer
could maintain a compensation action in Nebraska was whether
the work was in an industry in Nebraska or incident to a Ne-
braska industry. Thus where an employee worked for more
than a year in Nebraska while employed by a foreign corpora-
tion, it was held that the situs of the industry for purposes of
workmen's compensation was in Nebraska.97
Since the 1957 amendment, it appears that if part of the
work is performed in Nebraska and the employee is injured in
Nebraska while so working, it would make no difference if it
92 Suverkrubbe v. Village of Fort Calhoun, 127 Neb. 472, 256 N.W. 47
(1934). See also Solheim v. Hastings Housing Co., 151 Neb. 264,
37 N.W.2d 212 (1949).
93 NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-115(2) (Reissue 1960).
94 NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-112(5) (Reissue 1960).
95 Ibid.
96 NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-106 (Reissue 1960).
97 Solomon v. A. W. Farney, Inc., 130 Neb. 485, 265 N.W. 724 (1936).
See also McRae v. Ulrich, 147 Neb. 214, 22 N.W.2d 697 (1946); Rigg
v. Atlantic, Pac. & Gulf Oil Co., 129 Neb. 412, 261 N.W. 900 (1935);
Penwell v. Anderson, 125 Neb. 449, 250 N.W. 665 (1933); Esau v.
Smith Bros., 124 Neb. 217, 246 N.W. 230 (1932); Stone v. Thomson
Co., 124 Neb. 181, 245 N.W. 600 (1932); Freeman v. Higgins, 123
Neb. 73, 242 N.W. 271 (1932); Skelly Oil Co. v. Gaugenbaugh, 119
Neb. 698, 230 N.W. 688 (1930); Watts v. Long, 116 Neb. 656, 218 N.W.
410 (1928); McGuire v. Phelan-Shirley Co., 111 Neb. 609, 197 N.W.
615 (1924).
DEFINITION OF "EMPLOYEE"
were in a Nebraska industry or if the work was incident to a
Nebraska industry.98
XIV. CONCLUSION
The drafters of the Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Law
probably little realized the amount of litigation the provisions
on "who is an employee" would create. But they might have
some solace in knowing that other state acts have created the
same difficulties.
Some of the decisions of the Nebraska Supreme Court ap-
pear to be contradictory,9 9 while others, correct under the terms
of the act, seem improper when considering the purposes of
workmen's compensation. 100 For the most part, however, the
decisions of the court adhere to the holdings of other jurisdic-
tions in applying a liberal rule to cover as many employees as
possible.
98 Rapp v. Hale, 170 Neb. 620, 103 N.W.2d 851 (1960).
99 See, e.g., Schneider v. Village of Shickley, 156 Neb. 683, 57 N.W.2d
527 (1953); Snodgrass v. City of Holdrege, 166 Neb. 329, 89 N.W.2d
66 (1958). In the Schneider case, an electrician contracted to do all
the electrical work for the Village of Shickley as it arose. The work
was neither fixed as to amount nor time, and was irregular as to
both. Either party could have terminated the arrangement at will.
The village expected him to do the work personally although he
could employ others to help him. He did not work continuously
for the employer and he furnished his own tools. The village was
not interested in the details of how and when the work was per-
formed but only in securing a reasonably prompt and satisfactory
result. After the electrician was killed, the village apparently hired
another electrician. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that Schnei-
der was an employee of the village.
In the Snodgrass case, a tree trimmer was hired by the City of
Holdrege to do work when needed. He offered his services to the
public and hired others to help him. He had no definite hours
when he did the work and usually furnished his own tools. The
claimant was an expert in his business, and the details, method
and means of performing the work were left entirely in his hands
with responsibility for completing the job entirely under his con-
trol. After the claimant was injured, his employees finished the
work. In this case, the Nebraska court held that Snodgrass was an
independent contractor. It is difficult to distinguish the two cases.
100 For example, section 48-106(2) excludes the employers of farm and
ranch laborers from coverage of the act. The justification for this
exclusion is that farm and ranch labor is "non-hazardous." With
the advent of farm and ranch mechanization, agriculture has become
one of the most hazardous of all occupations. See 1 LARsox, WoPRK-
MEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 53.20 (1952). The validity of the above
classification, therefore, is of some doubt.
